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Abstract:  The bycatch problem has remained troubling and persistent, even in 
fisheries that have rationalized their target fisheries. The Alaskan Pollock 
fishery is an example of a fishery struggling to contain the bycatch of 
salmon in spite of a transformation of incentives associated with a 
harvester coop system in the target fishery. Recently the Council asked 
Alaska industry participants to devise their own incentive systems for 
reducing salmon bycatch, and the industry responded with two very 
imaginative schemes. One scheme proposes setting up a tournament that 
reward fishermen with low ex post relative bycatch rates. The other scheme 
is a tradable bycatch system with a quota and with carryover from year to 
year. Both schemes are ingenious, but complicated, and their ultimate 
impacts are difficult to forecast a priori. This paper develops simple models 
of each alternative in order to forecast and compare bycatch and other 
performance measures of outcomes. We explore how different design 
alternatives influence bycatch rates and efficiency under various abundance 
scenarios for bycatch. We speculate on how various restrictions imposed 
by the Council on the design influence the attainment of bycatch reduction 
objectives.  
 